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ABSTRACT: 
We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in 
favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects 
of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the state incumbent. Using a new 
database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a 
Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close 
races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per 
capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also 
show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held 
on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions 
with more budget resources. 
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RESUMEN: 
En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes 
regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido 
político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están 
políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que 
considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de 
discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: 
en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en 
media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de 
votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política 
es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones 
donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos 
presupuestarios.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, a number of countries have decentralized their provision of public 
services (see, e.g., Shah and Thompson, 2004). Such measures are recommended by scholars 
and international organizations alike as part of reform packages that can improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery (e.g, Brosio and Ahmad, 2009). A 
better matching of preferences (e.g., Oates, 1972) and increased accountability (e.g., 
Seabright, 1996) are the arguments often used to support this policy. Decentralization is 
typically recommended if these benefits can compensate for any inefficiency generated by 
spillovers and/or the limitations of economies of scale. However, whether decentralization 
can actually deliver these benefits is more controversial, with failure often being attributed to 
measures that are only ‘partial’ in nature, a term coined to refer to situations where the 
devolution of fiscal power is limited (e.g., Brueckner, 2009, and Devajaran et al., 2009). For 
instance, some authors claim that debt-related moral hazard problems can arise as a result of 
an excessive reliance on transfers (e.g., Rodden, 2002, and Weingast, 2009). Similarly, 
corruption is also said to be more prevalent with transfer-dependent sub-national 
governments, because of the diminished interest of voters in holding politicians accountable 
(e.g., Weingast, 2009, and Brollo et al., 2012). Moreover, according to Khemani (2010a and 
2010b), ‘partial’ decentralization might reduce citizen’s awareness of sub-national 
responsibilities thus fostering clientelism and rent-seeking.  
Various authors also point to the problems created by higher layer partisan incumbents 
that discriminate between aligned and unaligned local governments when allocating 
transfers, to the point that they are even able to influence the results of sub-national elections 
(Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2006, and Scheiner, 2005). This interference in the workings of local 
elections can ultimately undermine one of the very benefits of decentralization, namely the 
improvement in politicians’ accountability1. It is this specific issue that we focus our 
attention on in this paper. We examine whether the control of a higher layer of government 
by one party is beneficial for its co-partisans holding power at a lower layer. Specifically, our 
main goal is to determine whether Spanish regional governments (the so-called Autonomous 
Communities) allocate more transfers to aligned local governments – i.e., to municipalities in 
which the mayor is affiliated to the same party as that of the regional president. We focus on 
                                                 
1
 Some authors go further and suggest that the overall level of political competition in the country can be 
reduced if holding mayoralties helps the higher layer incumbent to become entrenched (see Scheiner, 2005). 
Other authors claim that the mere structure of local government might be endogenous to these practices, since 
incumbents might be reluctant to push for full decentralization if this fosters competition (see Khemani 2010b). 
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earmarked capital transfers, which are deemed to be the most discretionary of the transfers 
made in Spain. Additionally, we analyze whether partisan alignment has an effect on the 
votes obtained by a mayor at the local elections, and whether this effect is related to the 
larger amount of transfers allocated to aligned mayors. Finally, to shed some light on the 
mechanisms explaining these results, we study how these effects differs across municipalities 
depending on whether regional and local elections are held on the same day or not, the 
competitiveness of the regional election, or the amount of regional budgetary resources.  
Our analysis is motivated by plenty of anecdotal evidence that suggests that the parties 
controlling higher layers of government allocate more resources to local governments run by 
co-partisans, and that inter-governmental transfers are an important means of achieving this 
goal. At least in Spain, our case of study, voters and politicians alike seem to believe this to 
be the case. A recent post in a Spanish blog is illustrative of this: 
“The other problem [with transfers] is the ‘old-boy network’ and the 
‘partisanship’ of grantors. Nobody dares to meddle with this issue, for fear of 
being added to the black list, and so risk receiving less than is usually received, 
but the reality is that having a ‘friend in the right place’ and being a ‘member of 
the party’ weigh much more heavily than they should in the awarding of 
transfers.” (http://blocs.mesvilaweb.cat/sbaulida) 
Other informal evidence suggests that being aligned with a party controlling the higher layer 
might help a candidate to win more votes at the local elections, and that this might also be 
due to the higher amount of resources channelled to that municipality. Here is an example of 
how parties campaigned for votes at the last local elections held in Spain in 2011:  
“People should understand (when deciding their vote) that it is the PP (Partido 
Popular, the main right-wing party) who will be in control of the resources of the 
government of the Autonomous Community.” (http://comarcalia.info/).  
But can these examples be generalized or are they just a Spanish anomaly, anecdotes that 
emerge in the middle of a keenly contested electoral campaign? We argue that they are not 
merely anecdotal, and to demonstrate this we undertake a more systematic analysis, drawing 
on a new database of regional transfers to local governments and of voting patterns at local 
elections for around 3,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2000 to 2007. Likewise, we 
do not believe this issue to be limited to Spain, and so our results should be informative for 
other countries. For instance, Scheiner (2005) describes cases of both developing (e.g. India, 
Brazil and Mexico) and developed countries (e.g. Japan, Austria and Italy) in which transfers 
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to local governments are politically manipulated in favour of co-partisans. However, only a 
few papers provide quantitative, empirical evidence of this effect. Using US data, Grossman 
(1994) finds that states aligned with the federal government do, in fact, receive more funds. 
Arulampalam et al. (2009) find that the effect of alignment in India is to increase transfers 
from central to state governments by up to 16%. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2006), focusing on the 
Mexican case, find that under the PRI, the state governments controlled by this party 
received up to 40% more transfers than those controlled by the opposition. Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro (2008), and Brollo and Nannicini (2012), the only papers to examine grants 
to local governments, find an ‘alignment effect’ of between 30 and 40% for the cases of 
Brazil and Spain, respectively. A number of papers also examine the impact of alignment 
between layers of government on electoral outcomes2. There is evidence, for example, of the 
effects of the US presidential vote on state legislative elections (see, e.g. Campbell, 1986). 
Similar interactions are found for Argentina by Gélineau and Remmer (2006). In a 
comparative study of Argentina, Canada, Germany and the US, Rodden and Wibbels (2011) 
show that the interaction between federal and state or provincial elections becomes more 
apparent the more centralized the parties are. Bottom-up effects, from gubernatorial to 
national elections, are found by Samuels (2000) for Brazil.  
Our paper contributes to these two lines of literature in several ways. First, our focus on 
regional-local interactions provides greater plausibility to the main line of reasoning used in 
explaining the alignment effect, i.e. the difficulties in assigning political credit to the 
different government layers. Note, for instance, that the spending responsibilities of these 
two layers of government tend to overlap to a greater extent than those of federal and state 
governments. Indeed, quite often the provision of basic infrastructure (the specific target of 
the transfers we study) is a joint task, shared by state and local governments. Second, by 
focusing on local elections we are able to present evidence not only of existing 
discrimination in transfer allocation but also of the influence of higher layer incumbents on 
the results of elections at lower layers. It is worth noting that no previous attempts have been 
made in the literature to analyze ‘incumbency spillover’ effects between regional and local 
elections. Third, the use of data from several regions allows us to exploit institutional and 
political differences across these areas, which might shed some light on the particular 
                                                 
2Most of the papers dealing with ‘incumbency spillover’ effects examine interactions between different 
elections at the same level of government. There is evidence of US Presidential and Gubernatorial effects on the 
elections for the federal and state legislatures, respectively (e.g. Campbell and Summers, 1990; Folke and 
Snyder, 2012). Similar effects are found in Europe by Hainmueller and Kern (2008) and Ade and Freier (2011).  
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mechanism at work. In this sense, we are able to examine whether the effect of alignment on 
transfers and votes depends on the availability of budget resources in the region, the timing 
of regional and local elections, and the competitiveness of regional elections.  
Fourth, we are aware that alignment status might well be correlated with party 
popularity and so we use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in our analyses, thus 
focusing on candidates that barely won or lost a majority of seats at the local elections. 
Several recent papers in the ‘incumbency advantage’ literature use RDD as their main 
identification strategy (e.g., Lee, 2008; Lee et al., 2004; Hainmueller and Kern, 2008; 
Brockman, 2009; Folke, 2010; Folke and Snyder, 2012; Trounstine, 2011, and Ade and 
Freier, 2011). More closely in line with our concerns, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) use this 
procedure to study the effect of alignment on transfers in Brazil. However, the use of the 
traditional ‘close elections’ RDD, where the threshold is located at 50% of the vote, is 
problematic in our case, for two reasons. Firstly, local councils in Spain are elected using a 
proportional electoral rule, the d’Hondt rule, which generates many possible thresholds at 
which an additional vote can result in a party gaining one more seat, and none of these 
thresholds is necessarily located at 50% of the vote. To deal with this problem, we use as our 
forcing variable the share of votes that the regional incumbent’s bloc has to lose (win) in the 
local elections in order to lose (gain) the majority of seats on the local council. Secondly, in a 
large proportion of municipalities, no party has more than 50% of the seats, which means that 
in many cases the mayor is elected on the formation of a coalition of parties. In this paper, 
we document that usually these coalitions are formed along ideological lines. This means that 
the discontinuity in the treatment probability is lower than one, and, as such, requires the use 
of a ‘fuzzy’ RDD (Van der Klauw, 2002; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). This method consists 
basically in instrumenting the alignment status with a dummy equal to one if, at the local 
elections, the ideological bloc of the incumbent grantor obtains more seats than those won by 
the opposition bloc. This also constitutes a contribution of this paper to the RDD literature. 
Earlier papers have developed an RDD for proportional elections (see Folke, 2010, and Ade 
and Freier, 2011), and we use these as a benchmark for our study.  
Using the aforementioned ‘fuzzy’ RDD, we find a highly marked effect of partisan 
alignment between regional and local governments on the allocation of regional transfers to 
local governments. Local governments controlled by the same party as the regional 
government receive 83% more funds for earmarked capital transfers than is the case of 
similar unaligned municipalities. This effect is more than twice that estimated by OLS or 
‘difference-in-differences’. Moreover, mayors belonging to the same party as the regional 
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president receive around 10% more votes at the local elections. These effects are more 
marked when regional and local elections are held on the same day. We also find that these 
effects are stronger in regions with less competitive regional elections, and with more budget 
resources. This last finding suggests that the effect of alignment on votes works, at least 
partly, through the allocation of transfers.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical arguments 
that explain why alignment between incumbents at different layers of government might 
have an effect on the allocation of transfers. Section three provides the background 
information on Spain (i.e. local governments, transfers, and local politics) needed to set the 
stage for the subsequent analysis. Section four describes the econometrics and the data. 
Section five presents the results. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical discussion 
In this section, we review the main theories that predict an alignment effect (i.e., that 
municipalities controlled by the same party as that to which the regional president belongs 
will receive larger transfers from this layer of government). We briefly summarize the main 
theories of targeted public spending, then discuss how predictions may vary in the case of 
inter-governmental transfers (as opposed to the incumbent’s direct spending), and consider 
whether the outcomes in local vs. regional elections matter to the higher layer incumbent, 
and whether the timing of the two elections is also important.  
Swing voters, core voters, and pivotal districts. Extant models of distributive politics 
offer several explanations as to the ways in which public spending policies might target 
different groups of voters. First, higher layer incumbents might seek to enhance their 
probabilities of being re-elected by allocating more resources to constituencies with many 
swing voters (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996), on the 
understanding that their low party allegiance might make it easier to buy their votes. 
Secondly, politicians may choose to allocate transfers to places in which their parties’ core 
voters concentrate. There are several rationales that might account for this behavior. Risk-
averse incumbents, for example, might prefer the lower degree of vote variability among core 
voters to the only potentially higher average vote return in swing districts (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986). Additionally, the vote returns of a core-voter strategy might be higher if 
incumbents have a better understanding of the specific needs of their core supporters (Cox, 
2009) or if transfers to these places are effective in boosting turnout (Ansolabehere and 
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Snyder, 2006)3. Thirdly, when there are many electoral districts and the purpose is to secure 
a majority of seats, the strategy might be to allocate more resources to pivotal districts, i.e., 
those in which the incumbent won/lost by a narrow margin (Snyder, 1989; Case, 2001)4.  
Transfers and alignment. However, none of the above approaches is able to capture 
one of the fundamental traits of intergovernmental transfers. Contrary to other targeted 
spending programs, which are implemented directly by the incumbent, intergovernmental 
transfers are decided by the higher layer grantor government but executed by the sub-national 
recipient government. This is especially true in the case of earmarked capital transfers, which 
are the focus of this paper. In this case, the grantor selects the projects based on its own 
priorities and partly funds them, but it is the local government that must propose specific 
projects for funding and who has to contribute local funds to them and take responsibility for 
their execution. This overlapping of responsibilities means that the grantor cannot expect to 
reap all the political benefits from the tactical allocation of these transfers, since some share 
in the benefits must seep back to the local government. This should not represent an 
impediment for the higher layer grantor if the local government is controlled by the same 
party as the upper layer grantor (i.e., both layers are aligned). However, if the local 
government is controlled by the opposition, such transfers might not be that effective in 
improving the electoral prospects of the higher layer incumbent.  
At least two different explanations might be invoked to explain this seepage of electoral 
benefits across layers of government. Firstly, voters might split the political credit derived 
from the provision of the infrastructure between layers of government (Arulampalam et al., 
2009). When credit is attributed to the grantor government, the party in control at this layer 
can reap all the electoral benefits. If credit is divided equally between all layers, no one party 
can obtain an advantage from the additional transfers allocated to a municipality. When the 
strategy of the incumbent is to target swing voters, the division of political credit between 
layers means that a larger proportion of transfers will be allocated to aligned governments 
with larger numbers of swing voters (Arulampalam et al., 2009; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-
Navarro, 2008). The bold and dotted lines in Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 1 plot a hypothetical 
(and over-simplified) linear relationship between the electoral vote margin of the higher layer 
                                                 
3To date the empirical evidence is not conclusive as to which of these two hypotheses is most pertinent, some 
papers supporting the swing voter hypothesis (Case, 2001; Johansson, 2003; Dhalberg and Johansson, 2002) 
and others the core-voter one (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006). 
4
 The empirical counterparts of the pivotal district and of the swing voter hypotheses are similar, since the 
proportion of swing voters is often proxied by the incumbent’s vote margin (Johansson, 2003; Case, 2001). 
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incumbent and the transfers allocated to the municipalities under this hypothesis. The graph 
implicitly assumes that there are more swing voters in municipalities with a narrow margin 
of victory5. If the municipality is aligned with the higher layer incumbent (a situation that 
occurs when the vote margin of the regional incumbent is positive) and voters split credit 
between the two layers, the amount of transfers received will be higher, as indicated by the 
jump or discontinuity in the relationship between transfers and vote margin. This jump 
vanishes when voters are able to assign all the credit to the higher layer of government. 
Secondly, it is conceivable that partisan alignment between layers of government might 
also confer some benefit on the higher layer incumbent enabling him to reach his core 
supporters. The mayor might be particularly adept at identifying who the party’s core 
supporters are at the local level and what their specific needs are. Thus, controlling the 
mayoralty would ensure that the initial goals of the projects funded by the higher layer of 
government do not become distorted. Such a scenario suggests that the alignment effect 
might also interact with the core voter strategy. The bold and dashed lines in Panel (a) of 
Figure 1 show the shape of a hypothetical relationship between the incumbent’s vote margin 
and transfers under this hypothesis. In this case, we assume that transfers grow with votes at 
both sides of the zero-margin threshold. As in the swing-voter case, alignment makes the 
amount of transfers jump at the threshold. Of course, the alignment effect vanishes if the 
grantor is able to monitor the use of transfers fully without the help of the mayor. 
[Figure 1] 
 Regional vs local elections. These two justifications of the interaction between the 
alignment status and the incumbent’s vote margin at the higher layer rely implicitly on the 
assumption that incumbents aim to maximize their probability of being re-elected at the next 
higher-level elections. Arulampalam et al. (2009) explicitly acknowledge this fact. The only 
paper that suggests that the incumbent’s strategy might, in fact, be focused on winning local 
elections is Brollo and Nannicini’s (2012). This paper argues that in Brazil the best strategy 
for the federal president prior to the local elections is to aim to win as many mayoralties as 
he can, since mayors are influential opinion leaders in their communities and by engaging in 
campaigning and rent-seeking activities on the president’s behalf can help win more votes for 
the president at the higher layer elections.  
                                                 
5
 As discussed by Johansson (2003), this will be true if the distribution of ideological preferences in support of 
the incumbent (and, hence, against the opposition) is symmetric and single-peaked. Dahlberg and Johansson 
(2002) present results that suggest that the departure from these assumptions is not dramatic in practice. 
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In line with this hypothesis, to use the resources at his disposal efficiently, the higher 
layer incumbent should focus his attention on aligned pivotal municipalities, i.e., those in 
which the mayoralties were won by the narrowest margins. This strategy would target more 
funds for these municipalities (compared to aligned municipalities won by a larger margin) 
and punish unaligned pivotal municipalities, which would receive less money than aligned 
ones with a similar vote margin as well as less money than unaligned municipalities that the 
higher layer incumbent lost by a greater margin. The dashed and bold lines in Panel (b) of 
Figure 1 illustrate this idea. Brollo and Nannicini (2012) find mixed evidence in favor of this 
tactic, which they refer to as ‘tying your enemy’s hands in close races’.  
 Concurrent vs. alternating elections. Brollo and Nannicini (2012) focus on the case of 
Brazil, where local elections are held in the middle of the federal term-of-office. As we 
explain below, in Spain regional and local elections are concurrent in some regions and 
alternating in others. This distinction allows us to compare the strength of the alignment 
effect in both cases. The simultaneous occurrence of the elections may either reduce or 
increase the alignment effect. On the one hand, it might shift the attention of voters towards 
the issues that are most relevant at the regional level, thus limiting the tactical use of transfers 
to localities. Likewise, if the alignment effect only occurs when the strategy focuses on 
capturing mayoralties, then the urgency of winning the next regional election (typical of 
concurrent elections) might attenuate the alignment effect. Before regional elections, the 
regional incumbent might choose to focus on his core voters and if he is able to monitor the 
use of resources without the help of mayors, this will generate a core-voter type profile but 
without any discrimination in favor of the aligned mayors. On the other hand, the 
simultaneous holding of regional and local elections may increase the salience of local issues 
during the campaign for the regional elections. For example, in concurrent elections, regional 
candidates may well be obliged to speak about local infrastructure during campaign visits to 
municipalities. Similarly, even if transfers do not matter directly for regional elections, they 
might matter indirectly though their effect on the local elections, and the simultaneous 
occurrence of both elections could thus generate a ‘bandwagon effect’, with the impact on 
the vote of the local incumbent being transferred to some extent to the vote of the aligned 
regional incumbent. Finally, note that even in concurrent elections, the strategy of capturing 
mayoralties might make sense if the regional elections are not competitive. Intuitively, if the 
regional incumbent feels safe, there would be less need to try to increase the total number of 
votes. Instead, it might be worthwhile pursuing a longer-term strategy, i.e., winning 
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additional mayoralties. This would allow more perks to be distributed to party supporters and 
might prove helpful at future regional elections. 
 
3.  Background information on Spain 
3.1 Spanish municipalities   
Spanish government comprises three layers: central, regional, and local tiers. There are 
seventeen regional governments, the so-called Autonomous Communities (ACs), which have 
fairly wide-ranging spending responsibilities including, for example, the provision of health 
care, education and welfare. Spain’s local layer consists of over eight thousand 
municipalities, most of which are relatively small. These municipalities are multipurpose 
governments, with major expenditure categories corresponding to the traditional 
responsibilities assigned to the local public sector (environmental services, urban planning, 
public transport, welfare, etc.), with the exception of education, which is the responsibility of 
the regional government. Current spending is financed out of the municipalities’ own 
revenues (approximately two thirds) and unconditional grants (approximately a third). The 
latter are allocated according to a formula, which hinders their use for pork-barrel politics. 
However, the funding of capital spending is heavily dependent on grants: in 2008, capital 
grants, on average, represented 38% of capital spending. Most Spanish municipalities do not 
have the capacity to fund necessary investments from other sources: their tax bases are quite 
limited, extraordinary resources from asset sales are not always available, and some 
municipalities may even have problems to access credit. 
Capital grants are transferred primarily from the regional layer (64%) and take the form 
of ‘project grants’6: there is an open call at regular intervals (usually yearly) and a 
municipality can apply by submitting its infrastructure projects (e.g., street and road paving, 
sewage systems and water pipes, parks and recreations, educational and sports facilities, 
etc.). These are evaluated according to previously established criteria (typically published in 
the call), which are subject to the interpretation of the grantor. Provisions are usually made 
for funding emergency situations or projects considered a priority concern by the regional 
government. The call often does not specify clearly the weight attached to each of the criteria 
or it fails to specify the link between the score assigned to each criterion and an objective 
variable, leaving this very much at the discretion of the grantor.  
3.2 Local politics in Spain 
                                                 
6
 A 19% comes from upper-local governments and the rest from the central government or the European Union.  
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Local elections are held every four years on the same day throughout all the Spanish 
municipalities. Voters choose between several closed party lists. The electoral system is a 
proportional one, votes being allocated to seats using the d’Hondt rule with a threshold. The 
mayor is subsequently elected by a majority of the council (see Colomer, 1995). The council 
operates as a small representative democracy, and has to reach a majority vote to pass the 
initiatives and regulations proposed by the mayor, who acts as the agenda-setter. The 
discipline enforced by Spain’s political parties means that the chances of amending the 
mayor’s proposals are quite low when the mayor’s party or coalition controls a majority of 
the seats. The proportion of coalition governments is high (around 30% during the terms we 
analyze), and most are formed along ideological lines. There are, however, exceptions to this 
rule due, for example, to the fact that the platforms of many local parties are based solely on 
local issues and so they are under less compulsion to reach an agreement on ideological 
grounds or because of pressure form higher party ranks. Nevertheless, the influence of the 
party on the behaviour of local politicians is substantial, the local political system being seen 
as a first step to subsequent promotion at the regional and national levels.  
Elections to the regional parliament are also held every four years and on the same day 
than the local elections in thirteen out of the seventeen regions. We refer to these polls as 
Concurrent elections. In the remaining four regions (i.e., Galicia, Catalonia, Basque Country, 
and Andalusia), regional elections are held mid-term in relation the local governments’ term 
of office. We refer to these polls as Alternating elections. Voters also choose between several 
party lists, and the electoral system is also based on the d’Hondt rule with a threshold. 
Representatives elect the regional president who, in turn, decides the composition of the 
Cabinet. Here, also, around a third of the administrations are coalition or minority 
governments.   
 
4. Empirical design 
4.1. The ‘fuzzy’ RDD  
Papers using observational approaches to estimate the effect of party ideology on votes 
and policy outcomes may suffer from an omitted variables problem: party control can be 
correlated with the incumbent’s popularity and this, in turn, might have an impact on the 
outcome variable. To deal with this problem some papers have recently adopted the ‘close-
race’ Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) framework (see Lee, 2008; Lee et al., 2004; 
Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009; Albouy, 2010, Folke, 2010, 
Trounstine, 2011, and Gerber and Hopkins, 2011). The reasoning behind this method is that 
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elections won by a narrow margin are in practice very similar events to elections lost by a 
similar narrow margin. Thus, by focusing on close races, the RDD generates quasi-
experimental estimates of the effects of interest (see Hahn et al, 2001). In a recent survey, 
Green et al. (2009) show that RDDs are comparable in accuracy to experimental studies. 
As mentioned, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) use this approach to estimate the effect of 
partisan alignment on the allocation of federal transfers to local governments in Brazil. In 
this case, the treatment variable is defined as a dummy indicating whether the party of the 
federal President (or the coalition that supports him) won the local election. The authors 
restrict the analysis to two- and three-candidate races so as to avoid problems generated by 
the fact that Brazil is a highly fragmented, multi-party system without any stable party 
coalitions. In any case, the plurality rule used in Brazilian elections allows the authors to 
apply the traditional ‘close-elections’ RDD. This is not an option in our case, since local 
councils are elected in Spain using a proportional electoral rule. This rule generates many 
thresholds at which an additional vote brings one more seat to a party, and these are not 
necessarily located at the 50% vote threshold. To deal with this problem, we proceed in two 
steps. First, we compute our forcing variable as the share of votes that the ideological bloc 
(i.e., left or right) of the regional incumbent has to lose (win) to lose (gain) the majority of 
seats in the local council (and, thus, change its alignment status), henceforth referred to as the 
vote margin. The calculation of this vote margin is not trivial and has required the 
development of a specific procedure based on the d’Hondt rule. We provide more details on 
this method in section 4.4 and in Annex A.  
Second, we show that if the ideological bloc of the regional incumbent has a majority 
of seats in the local council it is more probable (although not certain) that this bloc also holds 
the mayoralty, which means that the two layers of government are aligned. This reflects the 
fact, discussed above, that, more often than not, coalitions are formed along ideological lines. 
This means a ‘fuzzy’ RDD has to be used (Van der Klauw, 2002; Lee and Lemieux, 2010), 
since this allows the treatment (i.e., alignment) to be determined only partly by whether the 
assignment variable (i.e. the vote margin) crosses a cut-off point (from negative to positive). 
While in the ‘sharp’ RDD the probability of treatment jumps from 0 to 1 when the 
assignment variable crosses a threshold, the ‘fuzzy’ RDD involves a smaller jump in this 
probability. Since the probability of treatment jumps by less than one at the threshold, the 
discontinuity in the outcome variable (that is, votes or transfers) at this point can no longer be 
interpreted as an average treatment effect. However, the treatment effect can be recovered 
either by dividing the jump in the outcome variable by the jump in the probability of 
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treatment or by estimating the effect of alignment on the outcome by 2SLS, using the 
threshold dummy as an instrument for alignment. 
 
4.2. Equation specification  
In our case, we use the following three-equation model: 
                                            iiii mgat εα ++= )(                                                           (1)  
                                            iiii umfav ++= )(   β                                                        (2)  
                                            iiii mh d a υγ ++= )(                                                         (3) 
where ti=per capita transfers received by the local government before the local election; ai=1 
if there is alignment between the regional and the local government and zero otherwise; mi= 
regional incumbent’s vote margin at the previous local elections; vi= vote share of the local 
incumbent at the local elections; di=1 if the regional incumbent’s vote margin is positive (i.e. 
di=1 if mi>0); the terms f(mi), g(mi) and h(mi),  include polynomial terms of orders one or 
higher, fitted separately at either side of the threshold (see Lee et al., 2004; Lee, 2008, and 
Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The first equation is used to estimate the effect of alignment on 
transfers. The second estimates the effect of partisan alignment on the local incumbent’s 
vote. The third describes the discontinuity in alignment that we then use to identify the 
effects of interest. Substituting (3) into (1) and (2) we obtain the reduced form equations: 
                                                iiii mk d t ωϕ ++= )(1                                                   (4)  
                                               iiii mj d v νφ ++= )(1                                                     (5)  
where ϕ=αγ  and φ=βγ are the ‘intent-to-treat’ estimates, which are equal to the product of 
the effects of alignment on votes and on the discontinuity. The estimation of equations (3), 
(4) and (5) allows us to recover the effect of alignment on votes and transfers as γϕα ˆ/ˆˆ =  
and γφβ ˆ/ˆˆ = . We could also estimate (1) and (2) by 2SLS, using id  as an instrument for ia . 
Both procedures should deliver the same estimate as long as the order of the polynomials
)( imh  and )( imj  or )( imk  is the same. The estimates obtained can be interpreted as a 
weighted Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), where the weights reflect the ex-ante 
likelihood of being near the threshold (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The specification in (2) 
and (3) can easily be modified to analyze possible heterogeneous effects. Being  z a dummy 
variable defining two non-overlapping groups of municipalities, we have: 
                     iiiiiiiii zmpmk zzdd t ςηηη +×+++×+= )()(321                               (6)  
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                   iiiii3iiii zmlmjz zdd v ϖλλλ +×++×+×+= )()(21                             (7) 
To deal with the possible correlation of this dummy with other traits that differ across 
subsamples we introduce the interactions between alignment and several of the variables that 
can affect differ across municipalities and the discontinuity dummy and the polynomial at the 
same time. Thus, the interpretation of the differential effect of alignment across subsamples 
relies on an identification strategy based on controlling for observables. Furthermore, in 
order to shed further light on the possible mechanisms behind the alignment effect we can 
examine the shape of the polynomial at either side of the threshold, comparing these results 
with the predictions derived from the different theories surveyed in section two. We are, 
however, also well aware that the shape of the polynomial has no causal interpretation in an 
RDD. To attenuate this problem, we discuss the shape of the polynomial only after the 
inclusion of a set of controls. The graphs used for this purpose plot the residual of the 
dependent variable (either transfers or vote share) against the forcing variable. This means 
that in this case too our identification strategy relies on our controlling for observables and 
that the conclusions reached are not as reliable as those derived from the main RDD 
estimates. 
 
4.3. Econometrics  
In implementing the RDD we have taken various methodological decisions. First, as 
shown above, our main estimation method uses all the observations while controlling for a 
flexible polynomial. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we explicitly test for the optimal 
order of the polynomial with the Akaike information criteria. This procedure allows us to 
retain the entire sample when estimating the heterogeneous effects. A possible drawback of 
this method is that our results might be sensitive to outcome values for observations far away 
from the threshold (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). To cope with this problem we also 
provide additional results obtained by restricting the bandwidths to 25% and 12.5%. The 
reason for this choice is that the optimal bandwidth size (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2009), 
is very close to 25% both for transfers (26.3%) and for votes (23.8%). Thus, in line with Lee 
and Lemieux (2010), we present our results with optimal and half optimal bandwidths.  
Second, in order to show the need for using a ‘fuzzy’ RDD, we verify the discontinuity 
in the treatment probability. To verify that there is a substantial discontinuity is tantamount to 
having a strong first-stage relationship in an IV design. Third, we also check the continuity of 
the forcing variable around the threshold by inspecting the histogram and using a more 
formal test (see McCrary, 2008). The continuity test provides a means for discarding the 
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manipulation of the forcing variable, an issue raised in various papers (see, e.g., Caughey and 
Sekon, 2011). For this same purpose, we also test for the continuity of some pre-determined 
covariates. Finally, we also provide some results using a set of control variables (see next 
section), in order to provide an additional validation check for our estimates (coefficients 
should not change greatly) and to improve the precision of our estimates. Furthermore, the 
use of covariates helps in the interpretation of the shape of the polynomials, since, as already 
mentioned, they have no causal interpretation in an RDD analysis. 
 
4.4 Sample and data. 
Sample. We estimate the effects of partisan alignment between local and regional 
governments on transfers from the regional to the local level and on the votes cast for the 
local incumbent using data on Spanish municipalities. We use two cross-sections of data, for 
the terms 2000-03 and 2004-07, with around 3,000 municipalities in each. The sample is 
determined by data on transfers taken from a survey on budget outlays conducted yearly by 
the Spanish Ministry of Economics. This database includes all the municipalities with more 
than 5,000 residents and a representative sample of the smaller ones7.  
Transfers. The main results we report are for the estimation of the alignment effects on 
capital transfers allocated to local governments in the two years preceding the next local 
election. As explained in section two, given the characteristics of these transfers, we expect 
them to matter more in the period running up to local elections. This distinction, however, is 
irrelevant for twelve out of the fifteen regions (i.e., those with Concurrent elections), as 
regional and local elections are held on the same day. It is true, however, than even if local 
elections matter most, the effect of alignment might differ in those regions with Alternating 
regional and local elections (see section two for a discussion) and this is why we also present 
our results for each of the samples. Although not included here for motives of space, we will 
also discuss the results obtained when analyzing the effects of alignment on transfers two 
year before the regional elections (in the case of Alternating elections) and during the first 
half of the term (in the case of Concurrent elections).  
In any of these cases, the two-year aggregation helps in reducing the volatility of the 
variable and the use of yearly information will not provide any statistical advantage, since the 
alignment status does not change between years within these two year periods. As we 
                                                 
7
 Due to problems in accessing the data, the analysis is restricted to fifteen regions, excluding the Basque 
Country and Navarre. These are quite small regions and their exclusion should not represent a big problem. 
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explained above, we focus on capital grants originating from the regional government 
because of a presumably higher discretionarity in their allocation. However, to confirm this 
intuition we also present results for the effect of alignment on current grants and on grants 
originating from other layers of government (Central and Upper-Local).  
Votes. The second outcome variable we analyze is the mayor’s vote share in the 2003 
and 2007 local elections. Our results using the coalition’s vote share and the probability of 
mayoral re-election are similar and not reported here for the sake of brevity. Votes by party 
at the local elections of 1999 and 2003 are used to construct the forcing variable and the 
discontinuity instrument. See Table A.1 in Annex A  for the source of the vote results.  
Alignment. As explained above, alignment is measured as a dummy equal to one when 
the mayor and the regional president belong to the same party, regardless of whether the 
government at both layers is a single party or a coalition8. See Table A.1 for the sources of 
these variables. As robustness checks, we have also checked whether the results are affected 
by the use of more comprehensive alignment definitions: situations where one party, even if 
it is not the main one, is present at both layers, and situations where the mayor and the 
regional president simply belong to the same ideological bloc and not only to the same party.  
Forcing variable. As explained above, our main forcing variable is the Regional 
incumbent’s bloc vote margin, computed as the votes needed for the ideological bloc of the 
regional incumbent to gain/lose the majority of seats in the local council, expressed as a 
percentage of total votes cast at the local elections. To define ideological blocs we classify all 
the parties standing at the local elections in three groups: left, right and local parties (see 
Table A.1 for more details). When the regional party is a left/right political party, all the 
categories except left/right are included in the regional opposition’s bloc. As a robustness 
check, we also provide results after excluding those municipalities with representation of 
local parties from the analysis. The results obtained do not depend on the specific treatment 
of these parties.  
To compute the votes needed to bring about a change in the majority of seats from one 
bloc to another, we use a very similar method to that developed by Folke (2010). He provides 
an algebraic formulation for this distance under the Saint-League system, the one in 
operation in Sweden (his country of study). With this formulation he is able to compute the 
number of votes that each party needs to win (or lose) an additional seat. We develop a 
similar algebraic formulation for the d’Hondt system used in Spanish local elections. What 
                                                 
8
 The concrete definition of alignment used determines the size of the sample, since we exclude the 
observations not included on the treatment or the control group. 
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we compute is the number of votes that the ideological bloc to which the regional president 
belongs must lose (gain) to lose (win) a majority of seats at the local elections. In order to do 
this, we make a number of assumptions regarding vote migration. We consider that the 
marginal votes lost (won): i) go (come) to (from) the abstention, or ii) partly to (from) the 
abstention and the other ideological bloc. We also assume that these votes are distributed 
among the parties of the bloc in line with their initial vote share in the bloc. The main results 
of the paper use the vote margin computed under assumption i)9. Intuitively, in this case, our 
formulation works as if we were subtracting small numbers of votes from the mayor’s bloc, 
distributing them among the parties according to their vote share within the bloc, while 
keeping the number of votes for the parties of the other bloc constant. As we subtract votes, 
seats shift from one bloc to the other. The procedure stops when we observe a shift in the seat 
majority from one bloc to the other. The number of votes needed to reach this point divided 
by the total number of votes initially cast at the election is our measure of vote margin. See 
Box A.1 in Annex A for the algebraic formulation used to compute the vote margin10.  
Control variables. In order to provide a further check on the reliability of the RDD 
results and to improve the efficiency of our estimates, we also present results when 
controlling for several covariates. In the case of the transfer equation, we control for 
log(population), land area per capita, property tax rate, assessed value of the property, debt 
burden, and Regional dummies × term effects (see also Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 
2008). In the vote share equation, we control for party of the mayor × term effects, Regional 
dummies × term effects, incumbent’s historical vote share, historical turnout at local 
elections, local coalition dummy, local first-term dummy, and population size dummies.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Exploring the discontinuity 
Panel (a) in Figure 2 plots the seat margin of the regional incumbent’s bloc at the local 
elections against its alignment status which is given a value of one if the mayor and the 
regional president belong to the same party. The graph shows a considerable jump when the 
ideological bloc of the regional incumbent moves from -1 seat to +1 seat (i.e., when it 
requires one additional seat to gain/lose a majority of seats).  
                                                 
9
 As a robustness check we have also examined whether the computation of the vote margin under assumption 
(ii) does change the results. 
10
 In Annex B (not for publication) we also provide a numerical example which illustrates how this method 
works in practice. 
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Although it might seem appropriate to perform the analysis by comparing the average 
value of transfers or votes for the municipalities located at the -1 and +1 values of the seats 
margin, this would not be correct, since this is quite a large group with considerable internal 
variability in the popularity of the regional incumbent. For this reason, we use the vote 
margin as the forcing variable, computed as the percentage of votes needed for the regional 
incumbent’s bloc to win/lose a majority of seats in the city council. Panel (b) in Figure 2 
shows the plot between this forcing variable and the alignment status. The dots represent 
averages of the alignment dummy over 5% bins. The size of the bin has been selected using 
the ‘bin test’ proposed by Lee and Lemieux (2010). The black line is the flexible polynomial 
fitted separately on both sides of the threshold. From the figure it is evident that there is a 
sizeable jump in the probability of alignment when moving from -1 to +1 seats.  
[Figure 2] 
Table 1 shows the results obtained when estimating the discontinuity with different 
bandwidths: 100% with polynomials of orders 1 to 3, and 25% and 12.5% with a local linear 
regression. In the full sample case, the Akaike information criterion suggests that it is 
optimal to fit a 2nd order polynomial. In this case, the estimated value of the discontinuity is 
85%. The results do not change much when other polynomial orders are used or when the 
bandwidth is restricted.  
[Table 1] 
A possible concern with the RDD is the possibility that the forcing variable might be 
manipulated. This could occur, for example, if the electoral results have been manipulated or, 
in the case of multi-party governments, if the vote of the last representative needed to form a 
winning coalition has been bought. We deal with this last problem by using local votes for 
the ideological bloc of the regional incumbent as opposed to votes obtained by the actual 
coalition that supports the mayor. A way of verifying that the forcing variable has not been 
manipulated is to examine its histogram or, more formally, to test for the continuity of this 
variable at the cut-off by running local linear regressions of the log of the density separately 
on both sides of zero (see McCrary, 2008). We have performed both checks, and we have not 
found any evidence of manipulation. Another validity check consists on testing for the 
presence of a discontinuity in the pre-determined covariates. The results of this exercise also 
suggest that none of these variables is discontinuous around the threshold11.  
 
                                                 
11
 All these results are reported in Annex B (not for publication), Table B.1 and Figures B.1 and B.2.. 
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5.2. Partisan alignment and transfers  
Figure 3 shows the plots between the forcing variable and both the amount of capital 
transfers and of residual transfers (i.e., the residual of a regression between transfers and 
control variables). The graphs suggest that there is a clear discontinuity: municipalities 
marginally on the right of the cut-off (those which are very likely to be aligned) do receive 
much greater sums in transfers than those marginally on the left (those which are very likely 
to be unaligned). The result is a little bit clearer in the when using residual transfers.  This 
shape suggests that the strategy used by regional governments revolves around trying to 
influence close local races in places where the mayor is a co-partisan. 
[Table 2 & Figure 3] 
Table 2 presents the RDD estimates. Panel (a) shows the Reduced form estimates while 
Panel (b) reports the 2SLS results. Columns (i) to (iii) show the results with the full sample 
and with polynomials of orders 1 to 3. The polynomial of order 2 is the optimal one 
(according to the AIC criterion). Column (iv) repeats the results using the optimal 
polynomial but introducing the control variables in the equation. Columns (v) to (viii) 
present the results with the 25% and 12.5% bandwidths, using a local linear regression and 
without (v and vii) and with control variables (vi and viii). The estimates are quite robust to 
the choice of bandwidth and polynomial order and to the introduction of covariates. The 
reduced form coefficients are around 80 euro and those of the 2SLS are around 92 euro. This 
amount has to be compared with the transfers received by unaligned municipalities just at the 
left of the cut-off, which are around 107 euro. With these numbers, an aligned municipality 
would receive 83% more per capita transfers than a similar unaligned one.  
 
5.3. Partisan alignment and votes 
Figure 4 shows the plot between the forcing variable and the mayor’s share of the vote. 
The graph suggests that there is a discontinuity in the vote share: local incumbents 
marginally to the right of the cut-off do receive more votes than those marginally to the left. 
The shape of the plot is as expected: to the right of the cut-off the local incumbent’s vote 
share is positively correlated with that of the regional incumbent’s ideological vote share; to 
the left of the cut-off, both variables are negatively correlated.  
[Table 3 & Figure 4] 
Table 3 presents the RDD estimates. Here, also, the results are quite stable across 
specifications. The reduced form coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level in 
all cases and identify a discontinuity between 3.8% and 4.4%. The 2SLS results suggest that 
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the average treatment effect is higher, between 4.3% and 5.8%. These are sizeable effects, 
especially if we take into account that a mayor’s vote share at the left of the cut-off is just 
42.7%, meaning that an aligned mayor will receive 10.07% (=4.3% over 42.7%) more votes 
than a similar unaligned mayor. Additional results (not shown here) suggest that the effects 
on the votes for the whole coalition are a little lower, implying that the mayor’s party is the 
one that benefits most from alignment with the regional government.  
 
5.4. OLS and ‘difference-in-differences’ 
The estimated effect of alignment on capital transfers (83%) is twice as great as the 
effect estimated by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) using ‘difference-in-differences’. 
This differential is striking, given that both studies draw on very similar data. Comparison of 
the respective results, however, is difficult, since the samples and periods are different. To 
determine the causes of this discrepancy, we have also estimated the alignment effect on 
transfers by OLS and ‘difference-in-differences’ (i.e., including municipality fixed effects) in 
our sample, controlling in both cases for the full set of control variables. The results, shown 
in Table 4, imply that aligned municipalities receive 52% more grants than unaligned 
municipalities. This is higher than the 40% reported by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 
(2008), but still much lower than our RDD estimates. 
 
5.5. Other transfers.  
We have also estimated the effect of being aligned with other layers of government 
(Upper-local government, and Central government) on the amount of capital transfers 
allocated by these layers to municipalities. The reason we do not focus on these transfers 
from the outset is the smaller quantities involved. The results are shown in Table 5 and 
suggest that municipalities aligned with Upper-local governments receive around 60% more 
transfers than those unaligned. The effect on capital transfers allocated by the central 
government is much lower, around a 27% increase, and is not statistically significant. A 
possible explanation for this result might be the fact that it is quite difficult for central 
government to discriminate in its allocation of resources given the high number of Spanish 
municipalities (around 8,000) and the consequent lack of specific knowledge about the local 
political situation of each. Thus, it might be the task of intermediate governments (regional 
and upper-local) to help channel the monies of central government to the most politically 
sensitive places (see also Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005, and Solé-Ollé, 2012).  
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We have also estimated the alignment effects on the current transfers allocated by each 
of the three upper layers of government. In each case the alignment effect is not statistically 
significant. This is as expected, since most current transfers to Spanish municipalities are 
formula-based and, as such, are much more difficult to manipulate than earmarked transfers 
for capital projects. Overall, our results identify the instruments and governments that are 
most prone to being affected by political tactics in Spain: capital transfers and intermediate 
governments, mainly regions  and, to a lesser extent, also Upper-local governments. 
 
5.6. Robustness checks.  
The results are robust to many changes in some key aspects of the methodology. We 
briefly discuss the main conclusions of this analysis12. First, the results are very similar when 
using two other (more comprehensive) measures of alignment: (i) including all the cases in 
which the main party at one layer (the one holding the mayoralty or the regional presidency) 
is a mere partner in the coalition at the other layer, and (ii) including includes cases in which 
the two layers are considered to be aligned if the mayor’s party belongs to the same 
ideological bloc than the party of the regional president, but it is not necessarily the same 
party. Second, the results are also robust to the exclusion of the municipalities in which local 
parties are represented in local councils, and to using only the municipalities in which the 
two main parties obtain more than 80% of the vote. Finally, the results are more or less the 
same when using an alternative measure of vote margin, computed on the assumption that 
votes are transferred not solely from abstention but also from the opposition bloc.  
 
5.7. Heterogeneous effects 
Concurrent vs. Alternating elections. Table 6 shows the RDD results (reduced form) 
obtained when including interactions of the discontinuity dummy and the polynomial terms 
with the election timing dummies. The results suggest that the effect is much higher (nearly 
twice as high) in the case of Concurrent elections than in the case of Alternating elections.  
[Tables 6 & 7] 
To shed some light on the mechanism that can derive these results, we interact 
discontinuity dummy and the polynomial terms, not only with the election timing dummies, 
but also with the other potentially disturbing variables. We consider, for example, that the 
alignment effect might also be affected by whether: (i) regional elections are competitive or 
                                                 
12
 The tables showing the complete results are included in Annex B (no for publication), Table B.2.. 
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not, (ii) the region has a large amount of budget resources, meaning it can allocate more 
generous capital transfers and that the differences between aligned and unaligned 
municipalities might be more marked, (iii) the municipality has greater needs or is in a 
poorer financial situation. The competitiveness of regional elections has been proxied by a 
dummy (Competitive) which is equal to one if the regional vote share of the regional 
incumbent in the previous regional election is lower than the sample median. The availability 
of budget resources has been measured by a dummy which indicates whether the region has 
more resources than the median (High resources)13. Municipal needs and the municipal 
financial situation are proxied by three dummies: Small, indicating whether the municipality 
has less than 5,000 residents, Debt, indicating whether the debt burden per capita lies above 
or below the median, and High fiscal capacity, indicating whether the per capita assessed 
value of the property lies above or below the median. We find that Concurrent is quite 
strongly correlated with Competitive (correlation coefficient equal to -0.52) and with High 
resources (correlation coefficient equal to 0.18) but not with the other variables (correlation 
coefficients around 0.05-0.07, in absolute value).  
In Table 6, column (iv) shows the results when introducing the interaction with the 
three variables at the same time. The previous results still hold; the effect in Concurrent 
elections being more marked than that in Alternating elections, despite the relevance of the 
other interactions. However, the difference between Concurrent and Alternating elections is 
now much smaller, probably as a result of the aforementioned correlation between election 
type and the degree of competitiveness of the regional elections. In results not shown in 
Table 7 (but available upon request), we find that all the financial needs and financial 
situation variables have a positive impact on the alignment effect, but these interactions are 
not statistically significant and their inclusion does not modify our conclusion regarding the 
difference between Concurrent and Alternating elections. In Table 7 we repeat the analysis 
but now for the local vote share. Once again, the alignment effect in Concurrent elections is 
stronger than that in Alternating elections even when we control for the other interactions.  
[Figure 5] 
The top panel in Figure 5 shows the plot between residual transfers and the vote 
margin for Concurrent and Alternating elections. The discontinuity is clearly larger in the 
first case. The shape of the two plots is similar, but in the case of Alternating elections the 
                                                 
13This variable is equal to one (zero)  if per capita standardized resources (transfers + standardized tax revenues) 
is higher (lower) than the sample median. Regional-level data to compute this variable comes from BADESPE 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, Ministry of Economics).  
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slope at the right of the threshold is more clearly negative. We will return to this when 
interpreting the results in the next section. 
Finally, the availability of data for the Alternating elections sample allows us to look at 
the effect of transfers two years before regional elections (as opposed to two years before the 
municipal ones). Our results (not reported here for motives of space) show that in this case 
partisan alignment has no effect on the amount of capital transfers allocated. It seems 
therefore that these transfers matter mostly for local elections14.  
Competitiveness and Budget resources. Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table 6 present the 
results for the interactions with the Competitiveness and Budget resources dummies, and 
column (iv) shows the effect of these interactions when they are introduced at the same time 
and simultaneously with the election type interactions. The results of this last column show 
that the alignment effect is also stronger in Non-competitive elections and in regions with 
High budget resources. Since there are just three regions with Alternating elections, and 
given the correlation between election type and Competitiveness and Budgetary resources, 
we repeated the analysis considering only the subsample of municipalities in regions with 
Concurrent elections. The results are shown in columns (v) to (vii) in Table 6 and suggest 
that the differences persist: the effect of alignment on capital transfers is higher in 
municipalities belonging to regions with Non-competitive elections and in regions with High 
budget resources. The differences are statistically significant and meaningful, especially for 
the Competitiveness interaction.  
The bottom panel in Figure 5 shows the plot between Residual transfers and the vote 
margin for Non-competitive and Competitive Concurrent elections. The discontinuity is 
larger when regional elections are non-competitive and the slope of the polynomial is clearly 
negative only in this case. We will return to this result below. 
 
5.8. Interpretation of the results. 
Our results can be interpreted as follows. First, the greater alignment effect reported 
here for Concurrent than for Alternating elections might be due to a modification in voter 
behavior  (and, hence, in politicians’ incentives) occurring in this latter case  due to the 
                                                 
14
 Additionally, we have used the sample of Concurrent elections to look at the effect of alignment during the 
first two years of the (regional and local) term-of-office. In this case (results also available upon request) we 
find an effect of alignment on transfers which is approximately half the magnitude of the effect found for the 
second half of the term.  
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simultaneous occurrence of local and regional elections. In Concurrent elections, voters cast 
their votes for local and regional candidates at the same time. In this case, if capital transfers 
confer some sort of advantage to the local incumbent, this advantage might automatically be 
transferred to the candidate from the same party at the regional level. This ‘bandwagon 
effect’ between candidates from the same party standing at simultaneously held elections has 
been documented in the literature (see, e.g., Ade and Freier, 2011). Similarly, in Concurrent 
elections, the local and regional campaigns might be more closely connected, with regional 
candidates having to speak about local issues during visits to municipalities due to the greater 
salience of such questions in the local campaign. This means that even if the infrastructure 
funded by capital transfers from regional governments plays a small role in party platforms at 
the regional level, it might have an indirect effect on voters’ decisions at that level. The 
absence of an alignment effect on local votes in the Alternating case can be similarly 
explained. 
Second, the fact that, in Alternating elections, alignment only seems to matter before 
municipal elections, but not before the regional ones suggests that regional incumbents care 
most about these local contests. In this case (and also in the case of Non-competitive 
Concurrent elections), the shape of the polynomial also points in the same direction, 
suggesting that regional incumbents aim at capturing as many mayoralties as they can. Figure 
3 clearly shows that transfers decrease before the threshold and increase after, which is the 
pattern identified in section two for this type of electoral strategy (recall Figure 1). Although 
the effect estimated through RDD cannot be extrapolated to observations far from the 
threshold, the shape of the polynomial can be informative about the strategies used by the 
regional incumbents. Among the aligned municipalities, the regional government would 
rather target pivotal municipalities than loyal ones, while pivotal unaligned municipalities 
might be specially punished. Figure 5 shows that this strategy is most apparent when 
elections are Alternating. However, Figure 5 also shows that in the Concurrent elections, 
regions with Non-competitive regional elections also adhere to this pattern. Moreover, the 
polynomial in regions with Competitive elections is quite flat, and the slope is even positive 
to the right-hand side of the zero-margin threshold. Similarly, the size of the discontinuity is 
much lower in this case. This suggests that an electoral strategy centered on pivotal 
municipalities might underlie the results of the Concurrent elections sample, at least for 
regions with Non-competitive elections. For the remaining regions in this sample, this 
strategy might be attenuated by a strategy that focuses on locations of core voters, with the 
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aim of improving the chances of winning a highly competitive regional election by trying to 
mobilize the electorate. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have used a ‘fuzzy’ RDD to estimate the effect of partisan alignment 
between regional and local governments both amount of transfers received and on the vote 
for the local incumbent at the local elections. We have provided very strong evidence that 
voters give more support to local incumbents belonging to the party that controls the regional 
government. Our results suggest that aligned municipalities obtain 83% more per capita 
transfers than unaligned municipalities. Aligned incumbents also win 10% more votes than 
unaligned incumbents. These estimates are much higher than previous estimates for Spain 
using ‘difference-in-differences’ techniques and much higher than results reported for other 
countries, including those using an RDD.  
We have also documented that the effect of partisan alignment is stronger: (i) when 
regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) when regional elections are less 
competitive, and (iii) when the regional government has more budget resources to fund these 
discretionary transfers. This interaction with the amount of budget resources suggests that the 
effect of alignment on transfers ultimately has consequences in terms of votes. Some 
secondary evidence suggests that the alignment effect might arise as a result of a regional 
electoral strategy centered on the transfer of resources to pivotal and aligned municipalities 
with the aim of winning as many mayoralties as possible. This strategy seems more evident 
in Alternating elections and in Non-competitive Concurrent elections. It seems, therefore, at 
least in some cases, that the regional incumbent pursues a deliberate strategy of interfering in 
the outcome of local elections. As discussed in the introduction, such practices might erode 
accountability at the local level and, thus, undermine the very benefits of decentralization.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1:  Discontinuity in the probability of alignment.  
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
      
      d 
 
0.879 
(89.13)*** 
 
0.853 
(55.02)*** 
 
0.848 
(39.90)*** 
0.897 
(102.78)*** 
0.865 
(59.64)*** 
R2 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.805 0.771 
AIC 
-2368.86 -2380.02 -2376.29 --.--  
      
      Bandwidth  100% 100% 100% 25%  12.5%  
Polynomial  order 1 2 3 1 1 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 2243 1150 
    
 Notes: (1) 2000-03 and 2004-07 terms. (2) Dependent variable is Alignment, a = 1 if mayor and the regional 
president belong to the same party. (3) Explanatory variables: discontinuity dummy d and polynomial on the Regional 
incumbent’s bloc vote margin; polynomial fitted separately on either side of the zero threshold; d is one if vote margin 
is positive and zero if vote margin is negative. (4) Bandwidth = 100% indicates that all the observations have been 
used in the estimation; 25% of vote indicates a bandwidth of -25% to 25%, 25% being (approximately) the optimal 
bandwidth of both the transfers and incumbent’s vote share used in Tables 2 and 3 (see below). (5) t-statistic in 
parentheses, robust standard errors used; ***, ** & * = statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels. (6) AIC 
= Akaike information criterion.  
 
Table 2: Effect of alignment on capital transfers. RD results. 
   
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
 
 
 
 
 a) Reduced form  
   
    d 
 
63.86 
(6.12)*** 
 
78.55 
(5.07)*** 
 
79.84 
(4.05)*** 
 
80.56 
(5.95)*** 
 
75.11 
(4.39)*** 
 
78.15 
(4.86)*** 
 
75.58 
(5.68)*** 
 
80.00 
(6.02)*** 
R2 0.081 0.082 0.082 0.282 0.073 0.229 0.104 0.234 
AIC 58434.10 58429.23 58433.09 --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
         
         
 b) 2SLS 
 
         a 75.65 
(5.31)*** 
 
89.36 
(5.08)*** 
 
92.97 
(4.54)*** 
 
91.65 
(4.97)*** 
 
83.73 
(4.88)*** 
 
87.12 
(4.97)*** 
 
87.37 
(5.13)*** 
 
90.39 
(5.76)*** 
 
         
         Bandwidth 100% 100% 100% 100% 25%  25%  12.5%  12.5%  
Pol. order 1 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Controls NO NO NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 4344 2243 2243 1150 1150 
         
      Notes: (1) See Table 1. (2) Reduced form = OLS regression of capital transfers against d, which is one if vote margin is 
positive and zero if vote margin is negative, controlling for a two-sided polynomial of the vote margin; 2SLS = 2SLS 
estimation of capital transfers against the alignment dummy, a, using d as the instrument, and controlling for the same 
polynomials. (3) Control variables included: log(population), land area per capita, property tax rate, assessed value of the 
property, debt level and Regional × term effects . See Table A.1 in Annex A for definitions and data sources. (4) Optimal 
polynomial order used in column (iv). (5) Local linear regression with optimal bandwidth used in columns (v) and (vi); ½ of 
optimal bandwidth used in columns (vii) and (viii). 
 
 
 32 
Table 3: Effect of alignment on local vote share. RD results. 
   
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
 
 
 
 
 a)  Reduced form  
   
    d 
 
0.066 
(9.16)*** 
 
0.048 
(5.00)*** 
 
0.047 
(4.01)*** 
 
0.044 
(3.64)*** 
 
0.053 
(5.59)*** 
 
0.044 
(2.56)*** 
 
0.036 
(2.38)*** 
 
0.038 
(2.67)* 
R2 0.096 0.103 0.100 0.554 0.065 0.571 0.140 0.644 
AIC 
-4931.17 -4957.77 -4949.28 --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
         
         
 b) 2SLS 
 
         a 0.075 
(6.44)*** 
 
0.053 
(5.06)*** 
 
0.049 
(4.78)*** 
 
0.058 
(4.86)*** 
 
0.059 
(5.71)*** 
 
0.051 
(2.56)*** 
 
0.038 
(3.10)*** 
 
0.043 
(2.81)*** 
 
         
         Bandwidth 100% 100% 100% 100% 25%  25%  12.5%  12.5%  
Pol. order 1 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Controls NO NO NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 4344 2243 2243 1150 1150 
         Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2) Dependent variable: % vote share for the mayor. (3) Control variables: party of the mayor × 
term effects, Regional dummies × term effects, incumbent’s historical vote share, historical turnout at the local and 
regional elections, local coalition dummy, local first-term dummy, and population size dummies (see Table A.1). 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of alignment on transfers & local vote share. OLS & Difference-in Differences 
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
 
  
 
  
 a) Capital transfers 
 
b) Vote share  
    
    a 
 
61.65 
(10.34)*** 
 
60.45 
(5.07)*** 
63.90 
(5.11)*** 
0.092 
(21.23)*** 
 
0.031 
(7.17)*** 
 
0.042 
(5.08)*** 
 R2 0.102 0.214 0.328 0.103 0.243 0.554 
       
       Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Municipality fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Obs. 4344 4344 4344 4344 4344 4344 
       
      
        Notes: (1) See Tables 2 and 3. (2) Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in eq. (iii) & (vi). 
 
 
Table 5: Effect of alignment on other types of transfers. RD results. 
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
   
 Capital transfers: Current transfers: 
 Provincial  Central  Regional  Provincial  Central  
   
  
 a) Reduced form  
   
     d 
 
22.44 
(3.34)*** 
9.33 
(1.23) 
8.92 
(0.78) 
3.44 
(0.45) 
4.56 
(0.27) 
   
  
 b) 2SLS 
  
   a 27.65 
(3.45)*** 
8.54 
(1.10) 
12.34 
(0.66) 
5.09 
(0.37) 
8.98 
(0.12) 
      % Increase 62.43 27.13 10.75 12.67 9.76 
      
      Obs. 3982 4344 4344 3982 4344 
     
                      Notes: (1) See Table 2. (2) % Increase = 2SLS coefficient over capital transfers evaluated at 
left limit of the threshold. 
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Table 6: Effect of alignment on capital transfers. Electoral margin and fiscal capacity. 
        
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
   
 All elections  Concurrent  
 
       
 
       d × Concurrent 
 
91.28 
(4.90)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 67.00 
(3.77)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
d  × Alternating 51.06 
(2.96)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 43.15 
(2.20)** 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
 
       
 
       d × Competitive 
 
--.-- 50.02 
(3.29)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 53.59 
(7.07) *** 
 
--.-- 47.75 
(3.78)*** 
 d  × Non-competitive --.-- 111.28 
(6.73)*** 
 
--.-- 32.06 
(4.22)*** 
 
121.57 
(8.00)*** 
 
--.-- 115.64 
(8.23)*** 
 
 
       
 
       d × High resources 
 
--.-- --.-- 108.85 
(4.19)*** 
 
16.06 
(1.58) 
 
--.-- 106.89 
(5.29)*** 
 
18.23 
(2.23)** 
 d  × Low resources --.-- --.-- 90.48 
(5.15)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 86.14 
(9.64)*** 
 
--.-- 
 
       
 
       Difference 
[F-test p-value] 
46.91 
[0.000] 
25.36 
[0.000] 
18.39 
[0.121] 
30.85 
[0.002] 
67.98 
[0.012] 
20.67 
[0.048] 
67.89 
[0.000] 
        
       
 Notes: (1) See Table 3. (2) Reduced form RD results. (3) Competitive/Non-competitive = vote share for the regional 
incumbent >(<) lower than the median. (4) High/Low resources = per capita resources (transfers + standarized tax 
revenues) >(<) than the median. (5) All equations have been estimated using the full sample, a two-sided second order 
polynomial for each of the interacted variables, and the full set of control variables. (6) Difference = difference between 
the coefficients of the two mutually exclusive categories (e.g., in column (iv) concurrent vs. alternating, and in column 
(viii) High margin vs. Low margin). (7) Standard errors clustered at the regional level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Effect of alignment on local vote share. Electoral margin and fiscal capacity.  
        
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
 All elections  Concurrent  
 
       
 
       d × Concurrent 
 
0.048 
(4.01)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.038 
(2.82)*** 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
d  × Alternating 0.012 
(1.29) 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.010 
(1.39) 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
 
       
 
       d × Competitive 
 
--.-- 0.037 
(2.65)** 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.029 
(4.53) ** 
 
--.-- 0.006 
(0.42) 
 d  × Non-competitive --.-- 0.047 
(6.96)*** 
 
--.-- 0.012 
(1.78)* 
 
0.048 
(4.02)*** 
 
--.-- 0.030 
(3.28)** 
 
 
       
 
       d × High resources 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.064 
(5.86)*** 
 
0.027 
(2.15)** 
 
--.-- 0.061 
(3.13)*** 
 
0.045 
(2.38)** 
 d  × Low resources --.-- --.-- 0.028 
(1.78) * 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.038 
(4.40)*** 
 
--.-- 
 
       
 
       Difference 
[F-test p-value] 
0.028 
[0.049] 
0.010 
[0.565] 
0.026 
[0.015] 
0.018 
[0.047] 
0.019 
[0.035] 
0.023 
[0.040] 
0.024 
[0.042] 
        
       
   Notes: (1) See Tables 2 and 4. (2) Reduced form RD results. 
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Figure 1: Transfers vs. vote margin in Swing voter, Core voter & Pivotal municipalities. 
  a) Swing voter vs. Core voter b) Swing voter vs. Pivotal  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Alignment vs margin 
  a) Seat margin b) Vote margin 
  
 
 
 Notes: (1) 2000-03 and 2004-07 terms. (2) Alignment Regional-Local = 1 if the mayor and the regional president belong 
to the same party. (3) Regional incumbent’s bloc seat margin = distance in seats to a change in ideological bloc’s seat 
majority; seats as obtained at the 1999 and 2003 local elections.  (4) Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin = distance in 
percentage of votes to a change in ideological bloc’s seat majority; vote shares as obtained at the 1999 and 2003 local 
elections (see Box A.1 in Annex A). (5) Dots = Bin averages; Bin size = 0.05 (40 bins); optimal bin size selected using a 
standard F-test for nested models (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). (6) Black line = 2nd order polynomial, fitted separately on 
either side of the zero threshold, using the full bandwidth. (7) Dashed lines = 95% confidence interval. (8) See Table A.1 
in Annex A for variable definitions and data sources.  
 
 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Al
ig
n
m
en
t R
e
gi
on
al
-
Lo
ca
l
-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Regional Incumbent’s Bloc Seat Margin
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Al
ig
n
m
en
t R
e
gi
on
al
-
Lo
ca
l
-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Regional Incumbent's Bloc Margin
Vote margin 0 
Swing or Core 
Swing 
Core 
Swing or Pivotal 
Swing 
Pivotal 
0 Vote margin 
 35 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Capital transfers vs vote margin. 
  a) Capital transfers b) Residual capital transfers 
  
 
 
  Notes: (1) Regional transfers = Capital transfers from the Regional to the Local government during the last two years of 
the 2000-03 and 2004-07 municipal terms. (2) Residual transfers = residuals from a regression between capital transfers 
and controls. (3) Black line = 2nd order polynomial, fitted separately on either side of the zero threshold, using the full 
bandwidth. (4) See Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Local vote share vs vote margin. 
 b) Local vote share 
 
 
   Notes: (1) Local vote share = % vote share of the local incumbent party at 
the 2003 and 2007 elections. 3) Black line = 2nd order polynomial, fitted 
separately on either side of the zero threshold, using the full bandwidth.  
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Figure 5: Residual capital transfers  vs. vote margin. Election timing & competitiveness. 
  a) All elections 
  a.1) Concurrent elections a.2) Alternating  elections 
  
 
 
 
 b) Concurrent elections 
  b.1) Non-competitive elections b.2) Competitive elections 
  
 
 
 
  Notes: (1) See Figure 2. (2) Residual transfers = residuals from a regression between capital transfers and controls. 
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Annex A: Data and variables. 
Table A.1: Definitions of variables and data sources 
   
 Definition Source 
   
   Capital transfers: 
Capital transfers from the Regional, Central, or 
Upper-Local governments per capita (items 7.5, 
7.2 & 7.6.1 of the revenue budget) Survey of local finances 
undertaken yearly by the Spanish  
Ministry of Economics 
(years 2000-2007) 
       - from the Regional gov. 
       - from the Central  gov. 
       - from the Upper-Local gov. 
Current transfers: 
Current transfers from the Regional, Central, or 
Upper-Local governments per capita (items 4.5, 
4.2 & 4.6.1 of the revenue budget) 
       - from the Regional gov. 
       - from the Central  gov. 
       - from the Upper-Local gov. 
Vote share: Votes for the party of the mayor and for the 
coalition supporting him at the local elections, in 
% of votes cast 
 
Local election statistics (votes 
and seats for all the parties) and 
partisan identity of the mayor, 
provided by the Spanish  
Ministry of Interior & Ministry 
of Public Administration. 
(2003 and 2007 local elections) 
 
 
 
 
Vote margin computed with the 
same data using an algorithm 
developed for this purposes that 
replicates the workings of the 
d’Hondt rule (see Table A.2 in 
Annex A) 
       - Mayor 
       - Coalition 
  Alignment (a): 
Dummy equal to one if the party of the mayor is 
the same as that of the president of the 
Autonomous Community, the Central government 
or the Upper-Local government 
       - Regional-Local  
       - Central-Local  
       -  Upper-Local-Local  
Incumbent’s bloc seat majority (d): Dummy equal to one if the ideological bloc of the 
party of the president of the Autonomous 
Community, the Central government or the 
Upper-Local government has more seats in the 
local council than the other ideological bloc 
       - Regional-Local  
       - Central-Local  
       -  Upper-Local-Local  
Incumbent’s bloc vote margin  (m): % of votes cast at the local elections that have to 
be added to (subtracted from) the ideological bloc 
of the Regional, Central or Upper-Local 
incumbent to win (lose) a majority of seats in the 
local council.  
       - Regional 
       - Central 
       - Upper-Local 
   Income per capita 
 
Residents’ income level, as estimated from 
objective indicators (e.g., cars, bank deposits, etc.)  
Anuario Económico de España, 
La Caixa 
(years 2000-2007) 
Debt burden 
 
Debt service (capital, item 9 of the spending 
budget, + interests, item 3)  as a share of current 
revenues 
Ministry of Economics 
(years 2000-2007) 
Land area per capita 
 
Urban land area per capita, including both built on 
area and un-built land plots 
Centro de Gestión Catastral y 
Cooperación Triburaria, Spanish 
Ministry of Economics  
(years 2000-2007) 
 
Property tax rate 
 
Nominal property tax rate (IBI), % on assessed 
property value 
Property value 
 
Assessed property value per capita 
   Population 
 
Resident population 
Padrón de Habitantes,  
National Institute of Statistics 
(years 2000-2007) 
% Old 
 
% resident population older than 65 years 
% Young 
 
% resident population younger than 18 years 
% Immigrant 
 
% resident population non-EU immigrant  
% Unemployed 
 
% resident population unemployed 
   Left mayor 
 
Mayor belongs to a left-wing bloc party  
Local election statistics (votes 
and seats for all the parties) and 
partisan identity of the mayor, 
provided by the Spanish  
Ministry of Interior &  Ministry 
of Public Administration. 
(all local elections since 1979) 
Coalition 
 
Mayor governs in coalition with other parties 
Local party 
 
Party of the mayor cannot be classified as left or 
right wing 
Historical turnout 
 
% of voting age residents voting at the local 
elections held since 1979 
Historical vote share 
 
% vote share for the ideological bloc of the mayor 
at the local elections held since 1979 
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Table A.2: Computing the vote margin. 
 Explanation: 
 The forcing variable for our RDD is the Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin, computed as the ratio 
between the minimum number of votes needed for the ideological bloc of the regional incumbent to gain/lose 
the majority of seats in the local council and the total votes cast at the local elections.The computation of this 
measure is not straightforward and requires a consideration of the specific allocation system used to assign 
votes to seats, in this case the d’Hondt rule. Under this rule the votes for each party are divided by 1, 2, 3, 4, 
…, N, where N is the number of seats to be assigned. The resulting quotas or comparison numbers are ranked 
and N seats are allocated using this ranking.  
        We have developed an algebraic procedure to compute the vote margin for each of the municipalities in 
the sample1. Our procedure works by subtracting votes from the regional president’s ideological bloc if it 
holds a majority at the local level, or adding votes if it does not. We make some initial assumptions regarding 
the migration of these votes. First, we assume that these votes either i) go to (come from) the abstention or ii) 
go to (come from) both the abstention and the parties in the opposition bloc. The formulation we present here 
is for the first approach i) and the formula used in the second approach and the Stata code are available upon 
request. Second, we assume that the votes lost by (added to) the regional incumbent’s bloc are allocated 
between the parties belonging to this bloc proportional to their initial vote share in the bloc. Below we present 
the formulation used for the close election cases2 –i.e., cases where the seat margin is –1 or +1. 
 Notation and definitions:  
 
i
Iv & 
k
Ov : votes for parties i and k., from the regional incumbent’s (I) and opposition’s (O) blocs, respectively. 
i
Iα  & 
k
Oα : votes for parties i and k as a proportion of the votes for the bloc they belong to.  
i
Is  & 
k
Os : seats for parties i and k. 
i
I
i
I
i
I
i
I svsc =)(  : comparison number for the last seat won by party i. 
)1()1( +=+ iIiIiIiI svsc : comparison number for the next seat to be gained by party i. 
)(min II sc = ))((min iIiIi sc : smallest comparison number for the last seat gained by a party in I.  
)1(max +II sc = ))1((max +iIiII sc : largest comparison number for the next seat to be gained by a party in I. 
  )( kOkO sc , )1( +kOkO sc , )(min OO sc  and )1(max +OO sc : comparison numbers for the opposition’s bloc. 
 Formulation: 
 If the regional incumbents’s bloc holds a majority in the local council and, so, a party from the opposition bloc 
has to gain a seat, its comparison number for the next seat to be gained, )1(max +OO sc , must be larger than the 
comparison number for the last seat distributed to a party in the regional incumbent’s bloc, once υ  votes are 
subtracted from that bloc. The condition for party z in the opposition gaining a seat is: 
                                                               )(min* II sc < )1(max +OO sc                                                         [A.1] 
where )(min* II sc  is the smallest comparison number for the last seat originally gained by a party, say party x, 
among the parties from the regional incumbent’s bloc once υ  votes have been subtracted. z is the party that 
has the highest comparison number for the next seat to be gained among all the parties of the opposition bloc. 
Expression [A.1] can be rewritten as )1/(/)( +<− zOzOxIxxI svsv υ , where xυ are the votes subtracted from party x.3 
Under the assumption that all the parties from the regional incumbent’s bloc lose votes according to the votes 
originally cast, expression [A.1] determines that the total amount of votes that the regional incumbent’s bloc 
has to lose to lose one seat is equal to: 
                                          1)/( += xIx αυυ        where    xυ = xIOOII sscsc ))1(-)(( maxmin +                                   [A.2] 
If the regional incumbent’s ideological bloc is in a minority in the local council, the votes to be added to the 
opposition bloc for a party, say part y, in this bloc to gain a seat are such that: 
                                                                )(min OO sc < )1(max* +II sc                                                           [A.3] 
where )1(max* +II sc  is the largest comparison number for the next seat to be gained by party y from the 
regional incumbent’s bloc, once δ  votes are added to the opposition bloc. Party y is the one that originally has 
the highest comparison number for the next seat to be gained. Expression [A.3] can be re-written as: 
                                           1)/( += yIy αδδ        where    yδ = )1))(1()(( maxmin ++− yIIIOO sscsc               [A.4] 
 Notes: (1) A numerical example illustrating the workings of this algebraic procedure has been included in Annex B (not for 
publication). (2) Whenever the seat margin is larger that one, the procedure we now explain is simply iterated until there is a 
switch in the bloc holding the majority. Then, the final measure of the “vote margin” is an aggregation of votes needed to lose 
(win) all these seats. (2) Party x is such that equation [A.1] and minM(viM - vi)/siM hold. Party x will typically be the party that 
gained the last seat. If there is another party that gained a seat (but not the last one) and which accrues a greater share of votes, 
this party could be the one that has to be considered in order to guarantee that the opposition bloc gains just one seat. 
